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Contests between groups are plagued by intra-group externalities (freeriding). Yet, costless 
incentive schemes that entirely avoid free-riding within a group might not be desirable, 
neither individually nor socially. In contests among two groups, a relatively weak (i.e., small 
or unproductive) group will optimally not implement them because they compound strength 
differences between groups. If both groups rein in their intra-group externalities, they are both 
worse off, compared to a situation with free-riding, if they are relatively similar. If they are 
sufficiently heterogenous, the weak group loses at the expense of the relatively strong group. 
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July 26, 2010 1 Introduction
“There are only 2 qualities in the world: eﬃciency and ineﬃciency,
and only 2 sorts of people: the eﬃcient and the ineﬃcient.”
George Bernard Shaw
“The average man has a carefully cultivated ignorance [...]
– a sort of cheerful ineﬃciency which protects him.”
Crystal Eastman
If groups rather than individuals compete against each other in a contest, a free-
rider problem among members of each group arises: when contributing to its group’s
eﬀort in the contest, every individual bears the full marginal costs while the marginal
beneﬁts partly spill over to the rest of the group (e.g., Konrad 2009, Chs. 5.5 and
7). The attending positive externalities arise both if the contested rent is a group-
speciﬁc public good (Katz, Nitzan, and Rosenberg 1990, Esteban and Rey 2001,
Epstein and Mealem 2009, Nitzan and Ueda 2009) or if the rent is a private good
(Nitzan 1991a,b; Esteban and Rey 2001, Nitzan and Ueda 2009).
The intensity of free-riding or, conversely, the motivation of individuals to exert
eﬀort is determined by the intra-group incentive scheme. In standard contest games,
these incentives are unseparably linked to the sharing rule, i.e. to the (usually ex-
ogenous) procedure by which acquired rents are distributed within the group.1 In a
number of economic applications, however, incentives to exert eﬀort appear to be
separate from the sharing rule. Think, e.g., of phenomena such as team spirit, identi-
ﬁcation with the group, or norms to contribute to the social good. In such scenarios,
individual members behave co-operatively (i.e., in the interest of the entire group)
– even if the distribution of rents follows a standard sharing rule. Alternatively, the
group could apply an incentive scheme that marginally equates individual and group
incentives. Such schemes were discussed by Nitzan and Ueda (2009) as a means to
motivate group members. We call an incentive scheme that aligns individual be-
haviour with group interest an intra-group eﬃcient incentive scheme (IGEIS).
Nitzan and Ueda (2009) study a contest where all competing groups jointly, but
exogenously implement an (costless) IGEIS. They show that larger groups beenﬁt
from such schemes at the expense of smaller ones. They do not, however, allow
1See, e.g., Nitzan (1991a,b), Baik and Lee (2001), Noh (2002) or Bloch et al. (2006).
1for the possibility that groups voluntarily and unilaterally implement an IGEIS.
More technically, they do not determine the Nash equilibrium for the adoption of
incentive schemes. At ﬁrst glance, this restriction seems innocuous. Why would a
group that has free access to an IGEIS not utilize it? After all, an IGEIS internalizes
all within-group externalities. We show that this intuition does not hold for contests.
If the competing groups have suﬃciently unequal strengths (due to unequal sizes or
diﬀerent comparative advantages), the weaker group may wish not to implement an
IGEIS even if that was costless. The rationale is to avoid the contest from heating up:
if group A is relatively weak, group B’s eﬀort is a strategic complement to group
A’s eﬀort, whereas group A’s eﬀort is a strategic substitute to group B’s eﬀort.
Thus, if an IGEIS makes group A more eﬃcient (and, thus, more aggressive) in
the contest, group B will show more aggression too. This compounds diﬀerences in
contest strengths and the share of the rent that the weaker group can acquire shrinks.
This eﬀect may outweigh the beneﬁts from a better intra-group organization.
This observation has an analogy in rent seeking contests with an endogenous
order of moves (Baik and Shogren 1992, Leininger 1993, Nitzan 1994). These papers
show that in a two-player Tullock contest where both players can choose the levels
as well as the timing of eﬀort, the weaker player, or – using the terminology of Dixit
(1987) – the “underdog” always moves ﬁrst. From the underdog’s point of view, the
favorite’s eﬀort is a strategic complement to its own eﬀort, whereas the opposite is
true from the point of view of the favorite. This strategic complementarity can be
used to reduce eﬀort if the underdog moves ﬁrst. A similar mechanism is at work here:
If a group is suﬃciently weak, an increase in its eﬀorts would be disproportionately
retaliated by the other, stronger group. Sticking with ineﬃcient group incentives
helps to keep the contest temperate.
In group contests, a greater eﬃciency within groups may also be undesirable
from the perspective of social welfare: it makes groups more aggressive, the costs of
the contests increase, rent dissipation rises, and social welfare is reduced.
This ﬁnding adds a new element to the discussion about the group-size paradox
(Olson 1965, Esteban und Rey 2001, Pecorino and Temimi 2008, Nitzan and Ueda
2009). This paradox posits that group size and eﬀectiveness in collective action are
inversely related for the case of collectively provided private goods, but positively
associated when non-rival goods are collectively provided. Esteban and Rey (2001)
have shown that this – in their terms – “general wisdom” need not be correct
2if the costs of eﬀort are suﬃciently convex.2 Our result pushes this ﬁnding one
step further: Independently of the nature of the rent earned from collective action,
(relatively) larger group have a stronger incentive than smaller ones to increase their
eﬀectiveness in collective action (by introducing an IGEIS). Relatively small groups
cannot only aﬀord it more easily to remain ineﬃcient (as their free-rider problem
is less severe), any attempt of this group to solve its internal organization problem
will be retaliated by the other group, diluting the potential beneﬁts of eﬃcient
within-group incentives. The ineﬃcient organization of a relatively small/weak group
may therefore be simply an expression of its relative smallness and/or weakness,
an optimal adoption to its dominant environment. Hence, relatively large groups
may end up with a comparative advantage for collective action precisely because
of their large free-rider problems, and seemingly ineﬃcient organizational structures
for collective action in smaller groups may be deliberately chosen to limit the adverse
consequences of one’s weakness.
Section 2 introduces a model that captures these eﬀects. Section 3 analyzes the
attending game before Section 4 discusses welfare implications. Section 5 concludes.
2 A model of group incentives
We model a contest between two groups, A and D. Group k = A,D consists of
Nk ≥ 2 identical members. Without loss of generality, we set ND = N and write
NA = αND = αN for some α ≥ 2/ND.3 The two groups compete against each other
for a given rent. As in Esteban and Rey (2001), this rent has a rival component, R, as
well as a public component, P.4 Using z ∈ [0,1] to measure the degree of publicness
of the rent and assuming that an equal-sharing rule is applied to distribute the rival
part of the rent within a group, a generic member of group D [of group A] has a
2Pecorino and Temini (2008) at least partly re-established the “general wisdom” by allowing
for small ﬁxed costs. In the same spirit, Nitzan and Ueda (2009) explicitly model the within-
group utilization of the good and show that this generalization strenghtens the possibility of the
group-size paradox.
3At some places in this paper, we treat α as if it could vary continuously. This is for expositional
simplicity only; restrictions on α to ensure that NA is an integer would not aﬀect any of our
observations.









in case his group wins the rent.
The members of groups A and D voluntarily invest eﬀorts a = {a1,...,aNA}
and d = {d1,...,dND} in the contest. The probability pk that the contest is won by



















The parameter θ > 0 measures the relative eﬀectiveness of group A; if θ > 1 group
A is c.p. more eﬃcient than group B. Hence, we allow for two sources of asymmetry
between the groups, relative group size α and an innate comparative (dis-)advantage
θ. Individuals are risk neutral, and the opportunity costs of investments and the rent
are perfect substitutes.
We analyze two diﬀerent incentive schemes, one with non-internalized intra-group
externalities and an intra-group eﬃcient incentive scheme (IGEIS). With the former,
group members choose their eﬀort levels in view of individuals beneﬁts, as given in
(1). This coincides with the standard approach to contests. If an IGEIS is applied,
every group member behaves as if she maximized aggregate group welfare, viewing
the value of the rent as (1 − z)R + zNkP. This is tantamount to assuming that
individuals act as if maximizing a utilitarian welfare maximization which, given
our assumptions on the utility functions, is equivalent to aiming at Pareto eﬃciency.
An IGEIS is merely an incentive device, which does not alter the total quantity of
resources or their actual distribution: if a group wins the contest, the rent is still
shared equally and every group member “only” consumes (1 − z)R/Nk + zP.
In standard contests (i.e., without an IGEIS), individual eﬀorts involve a positive
externality: they increase the group’s probability to win the rent, a beneﬁt that spills
over to all group members.6 With an IGEIS, individual and social (marginal) beneﬁts
5For expositional simplicity we suppress parameters θ,α, and N as arguments of functions when
not needed.
6A small increase in eﬀort by a member of group k increases the winning probablity for that
group by dpk. Excluding eﬀort costs, this increases group welfare by [(1 − z)R + zNkP] · dpk and
individual utility by [(1−z)R/Nk+zP]·dpk. The diﬀerence between these values is positive. Hence,
a positive marginal externality.
4from eﬀort choice are equated; individuals behave as if intra-group externalities
were internalized. To illustrate, an IGEIS could be a Clark-Groves-Vickrey type of
incentive scheme or result from individuals adopting a team spirit or a group identity
in the sense of Akerlof and Kranton (2003).
We assume that a perfect and costless IGEIS is available. We do, of course, not
claim that this is the case in reality. Yet, the assumption of a costless IGEIS makes
our point as strong as possible – as we plan to derive conditions under which a group
will voluntary abstain from using such a seemingly ideal tool.
We code the adoption of an IGEIS by group k by sk = 1 and non-adoption
by sk = 0. Formally, the two cases diﬀer by what group members perceive as the
behaviourally relevant rent (per group member) from the contest. Denoting these
rents for groups A and D by, respectively, WA(sA) and WD(sD), we obtain:
WA(sA) =
(
(1 − z)R + zαNP if sA = 1




(1 − z)R + zNP if sD = 1
(1 − z)R/N + zP if sD = 0
(see Esteban and Rey 2001). Observe that Wk(0) coincides with the actual rent (1),
while Wk(1) = NkWk(0) equals the total rent for the entire group.
We study a two-stage game where groups ﬁrst and simultaneously decide whether
to use the IGEIS or not and then, given these choices, play a simultaneous contest
game at the second stage. The game is solved by backwards induction.
3 The game
3.1 The contest at stage 2
We determine the Nash equilibria of the contest subgame for all combinations of
(sA,sD), i.e., for (0,0), (1,0), (0,1), and (1,1). Members of groups A and D behave
as if they maximized utility functions
u
i
k(a,d) = pA(a,d) · WA − ai and u
i
D(a,d) = pD(a,d) · WD − di, (3)
5depending on (sA,sD) as speciﬁed above. Restricting attention to symmetric equilib-

















(WD(sD) + θWA(sA))2. (5)
Since Wk(1) > Wk(0) we obtain that, given the other group’s choice of s, an indi-





i(sA,0). This simply reﬂects the IGEIS’ po-
tential to rein in within-group externalities.
We denote the associated utility levels of the contest subgame by VA(sA,sD) and
VD(sA,sD), respectively. These values are calculated using actual beneﬁts, i.e., using
in (3) the rents from (1) rather than Wk (for sk = 1).
3.2 The choice of an incentive scheme at stage 1
We assume that an IGEIS is implemented by a group if it increases the per-capita
(indirect) utility of its group members, i.e., if VA(1,sD) > VA(0,sD), VD(sA,1) >
VD(sA,0). Obviously, in a non-strategic environment it is always optimal to imple-
ment an IGEIS: it internalizes the otherwise persistent intra-group externalities. For
a contest environment the case is less obvious. The adoption of an IGEIS by, say,
group A not only inﬂuences the behavior of the members of this group, but has
spillover eﬀects on the behavior of group D. This repercussion is helpful from the
point of view of group D if a more aggressive behavior of group A makes group
D less aggressive. In the opposite case, however, the net eﬀect is not clear. The
optimal decision for or against an IGEIS depends on whether group A’s and group
D’s investments are strategic substitutes or complements as well as on the abso-
lute strength of the eﬀect (because the choice problem is discrete). The following
proposition characterizes the equilibrium choice of incentive schemes.
Proposition: There exist threshold values θ(α) and ¯ θ(α) with 0 <
θ(α) < ¯ θ(α) such that:
7Baik (2008) has shown that the eﬀort (sub-)game has multiple equilibria. All equilibria share,
however, that the sum (within each group) of eﬀorts is identical, which implies that our restriction
on symetric equilibria has no inﬂuence on the aggregate winning probabilities of the two groups.
61. If θ < θ(α) the Nash equilibrium is sA = 0,sD = 1.
2. If θ(α) < θ < ¯ θ(α) the Nash equilibrium is sA = sD = 1.
3. If θ > ¯ θ(α) the Nash equilibrium is sA = 1,sD = 0.
4. If θ = θ(α), there are two Nash equilibria: sA = 0,sD = 1 and sA =
sD = 1. If θ = ¯ θ(α), there are two Nash equilibria: sA = 1,sD = 0
and sA = sD = 1.













Figure 1: Equilibria for diﬀerent α-θ-combinations (N = 3, R = 1, P = 1, z = 0.5).
relatively “weak” groups may abstain from introducing an IGEIS, where from the
point of view of group A (the opposite is true for group D) weakness refers to a
combination of low θ and low α. It is clear that group A is favored by large values
of θ, however, in the light of the group-size paradox (Olson 1965, Esteban and Rey
2001) it is not clear that large values of α favor group A. A relatively large group size
only creates the potential for strength that can only be exploited if the within-group
incentive problem is solved. In that case, however, potential is transformed into
actual strength. As a consequence, asymmetric equilibria are possible if diﬀerences
in relative size and/or contest productivity are large.
8In Appendix A.1, we derive that θ(α) = 0.5Φ(α)(
p
(αN − 2)αN + 5 − (αN − 1)), ¯ θ(α) =
0.5Φ(α)(
p
(N − 2)N + 5+(N −1)), and Φ(α) =
(1−z)R+zNP
(1−z)R+zαNP . These are all decreasing functions
of α, and it is straightforward to check that ¯ θ(α) > Φ(α) > θ(α) for all α.
7To get a better intuition for this result it is useful to extend the concepts of
“favorite” and “underdog” from Dixit (1987) to group contests. Group A is called the
underdog [the favorite] if the cross-partial derivative of the contest success function,







(for generic group members i,j) is negative [positive]. Since pda
D = −pad
A by construc-
tion, group D is a favorite [underdog] whenever group A is an underdog [favorite]. If
group A is a favorite, then its eﬀort in the contest is a strategic complement to the
underdog D’s eﬀort and, conversely, the underdog D’s eﬀort is a strategic substi-
tute to group A’s eﬀort (and mutatis mutandis when A is the underdog). Favorites
become more aggressive when the contestant increases its contest eﬀort. Underdogs,
however, duck out.
In the Appendix we show that, if an asymmetric equilibrium emerges, the group
that implements an IGEIS (i.e., the relatively large or eﬀective group) must be a
favorite while the other group is an underdog. An increase in the eﬀort of the favorite
would reduce eﬀort by the other group (whose investment is a strategic substitute to
the favorite’s investment), whereas an increase in the underdog’s would encourage
the other group to also increase eﬀort (the favorite’s investment being a strategic
complement to the underdog’s investment by j). In the intermediate cases (where a
symmetric equilibrium occurs), the cross eﬀects are relatively weak.
This ﬁnding adds an interesting new aspect to the discussion about the validity
of the group-size paradox: relatively large groups may end up with a comparative
advantage exactly because their large free-rider problem puts pressure on the estab-
lishment of eﬃcient incentive schemes.
The second important aspect of this ﬁnding is that an apparently ineﬃcient
internal organizational structure may be optimal after all: it is rationally selected
by underdogs to keep the contest more temperate. As a general lesson, incentive
schemes can only be assessed properly in knowledge on the economic environment
in which the organization exist that choose them.
84 Welfare
The strategic interdependence of the groups’ organizational choices may lead to a
social dilemma: even if it is optimal for both groups to introduce an IGEIS, the
consequence may be that both groups are worse-oﬀ in equilibrium. Analogously, it
is possible in an asymmetric equilibrium that a group that introduces an IGEIS
proﬁts at the expense of the other group. To analyze this question, we compare the
utility levels in equilibria with and without IGEIS.
We start with the case of equally-sized groups:
Proposition 2: Assume that α = 1. Compared to a situation sD =
sA = 0,
1. group D is better oﬀ and group A is worse oﬀ if θ < θ;
2. both groups are worse oﬀ if θ ≤ θ ≤ ¯ θ; and
3. group A is better oﬀ and group D is worse oﬀ if ¯ θ < θ.
This ﬁnding reveals two properties of the “incentive game”. First, if neither group
has a suﬃciently large comparative advantage in the contest, the choice of an IGEIS
has a typical prisoners’ dilemma structure (item 2). Second, if one of the groups
has a suﬃciently large comparative disadvantage in the contest that an asymmetric
equilibrium results, this group proﬁts at the expense of the other group by the
introduction of an IGEIS (items 1 and 3).
For groups of unequal sizes the following results can be established:
Proposition 3a: Assume that θ ≤ θ ≤ ¯ θ (i.e., both groups choose
an IGEIS). Compared to a situation where both groups have a simple
sharing rule,
1. both groups are worse oﬀ if they have similar sizes;
2. group A is better oﬀ [worse oﬀ] if its group size αN is suﬃciently
larger [smaller] than the group size of D, N.
The opposite result to 2. holds for group D.
9Part 1 of Proposition 3a follows the same logic as Proposition 2. The introduction
of an IGEIS makes both groups more aggressive. If both groups are relatively similar,
the resulting eﬀect on the equilibrium probability is relatively small such that the
eﬀect on welfare is negative. For unequal group sizes, part 2 shows that a large
group can be better oﬀ in an equilibrium with IGEIS. Following the above line of
argumentation, the eﬀect on equilibrium probabilities is suﬃciently biased in favor
of the larger group in this case. This guarantees for this group an increase in group
welfare.
We now show that this intuition carries over to the case of asymmetric equilibria:
Proposition 3b: Assume that θ < θ [θ > ¯ θ]. Group D [A] beneﬁts at
the expense of group A [D] compared to a situation where both groups
apply a simple sharing rule.
Figure 2 summarizes our ﬁndings. The ﬁgure is a identical to Figure 1 with the
A B C










Figure 2: Welfare eﬀects for diﬀerent α-θ-combinations (N = 7, R = 1, P = 1,
z = 0.5).
exception that we divide the range of (α,θ)-combinations that lead to an equilibrium
where both groups choose an IGEIS is further divided into three subregions. Both
groups are wore-oﬀ compared to the equilibrium with an equal-sharing rule in area
B. Group D proﬁts at the expense of group A in area A as well as at all points
10below the lower black graph θ(α). Group A proﬁts at the expense of group D in
area C as well as at all points above the upper black graph ¯ θ(α).
5 Conclusions
Incentive schemes are of crucial importance for the behavior of individuals in group
contests. They help to rein in free-riding among group members and thus ceteris
paribus help to increase the share of the rent that can be appropriated in the contest.
Yet, this does not imply that the internalization of intra-group externalities is a
dominant strategy or even welfare-improving. If a group is relatively weak, it may
fare better when leaving its members with only weak incentives to expend (fruitless)
eﬀort in a contest with a stronger rival. Moreover, the additional aggression induced
by high-powered incentives may be socially wasteful (increase in rent dissipation).
Our ﬁndings shed new light on the persistence of apparently ineﬃcient organiza-
tional structures. Incentive schemes applied within organizations can in general not
be evaluated without taking into account the competitive environment of the orga-
nization. What appears to be ineﬃcient from an isolated, single-group perspective
may be an optimal adaptation to a speciﬁc contest environment.
In addition our results in a sense turns the group-size paradox upside down.
Esteban and Rey (2001) have shown that larger groups need not be less eﬀective
than smaller groups. On the contrary, if the costs of eﬀort are suﬃciently convex,
larger groups may end up in a better position. Our paper shows that even in a
situation with constant marginal costs, larger groups may end up in a better position
because they have a more urgent need to introduce eﬃcient incentive schemes. Of
course this result recommits the discussion to a meta level: the implementation of
an eﬃcient incentive scheme has the character of a group-speciﬁc public good. If it
comes along with some ﬁxed costs of implementation (from which we abstract), it
may create a group-size problem of its own.
11Appendix A: Proofs for Section 3
A.1: Proof of Proposition 1
Group D: (i.) Suppose group A chooses sA = 0. Then for a member of group
D, the utility diﬀerential between sD = 1 and sD = 0, ∆D(1,0 | sA = 0) =
VD(0,1,θ,α,N) − VD(0,0,θ,α,N) is larger than zero if and only if
αN3((1 − z)R + zNP)
(1 − z)Rθ + αN((1 − z)R + P(N + θ)z))2
−
(N − 1)Rθ(1 − z) + αN((1 − z)R + zP(N + (N − 1)θ))
(R(α + (1 − z)θ) + α(NzP(1 + θ) − R))2 > 0.








N(N − 2) + 5 + (N − 1)
￿
> 0,
and Φ := ((1 − z)R + zNP)/((1 − z)R + zαNP) > 0 is the welfare-ratio between
group D and A. The condition holds if the relative eﬀectiveness of group D is not
too strong.
(ii.) For sA = 1, the utility diﬀerential ∆D(1,0 | sA = 1) = VD(1,1,θ,α,N) −
VD(1,0,θ,α,N) is larger than zero if and only if
(1 − z)R + zNP
((1 − z)R(1 + θ) + z(1 + αθ)NP))2
−
(1 − z)R(1 + (N − 1)θ) + zNP(1 − α(1 − N)θ
((1 − z)R(1 + Nθ + zNP(1 + αNθ))2 > 0,








(N − 2)N + 5 + (N − 1)) > 0.
Again, this condition holds if the relative eﬀectiveness of group D is not too strong.
Note that θ1
D > θ2
D because α ≥ 2/N.
Group A: (iii.) If sD = 0, the utility diﬀerential between sA = 1 and sA = 0,
∆A(1,0 | sD = 0) = VA(1,0,θ,α,N) − VD(0,0,θ,α,N) is larger than zero if and
only if
θN3((1 − z)R + zαNP)
((1 − z)R(1 + θN) + zNP(1 + αθN))2
−
(1 − z)R(N(α + θ) − 1) + zNP(αN(1 + θ) − 1))
((1 − z)R(θ − α) + zNPα(1 + θ))2 ,








(αN − 2)αN + 5 − (αN − 1)
￿
> 0.
This ﬁnding and its interpretation are symmetric to case (i.).
(iv.) If sD = 1, the utility diﬀerential between sA = 1 and sA = 0, ∆A(1,0 | sD =
1) = VA(1,1,θ,α,N) − VD(0,1,θ,α,N) is larger than zero if and only if
θ((1 − z)R + zαNP)
((1 − z)R(1 + θ) + zNP(1 + αθ))2
−
(1 − z)R(Nα + θ) − 1) + zNP(α(N + θ) − 1)
((1 − z)R(θ + αN) + zNP(N + θ))2








(αN − 2)αN + 5 − (αN − 1)
￿
.
This ﬁnding and its interpretation are symmetric to case (ii.). Note that θ2
A > θ1
A.
To summarize, there are four equilibrium conﬁgurations:
sD = 0,sA = 0 if θ
1
D ≤ θ ≤ θ
1
A










sD = 1,sA = 1 if θ
2
A ≤ θ ≤ θ
2
D.




A. In addition it is straight-
forward to show that θ2
A < θ2
D: The diﬀerence θ2
D − θ2
A = (1 + a)N − 2 +
p
(N − 2)N + 5 −
p
(αN − 2)αN + 5 has to be positive for all α ≥ 2/N,N ≥ 2,
or alternatively ND + NA − 2 +
p
(ND − 2)ND + 5 ≥
p
(NA − 2)NA + 5 ≥ 0.
Since the lhs of this inequality is increasing in ND, it is suﬃcient to show that
NA +
√
5 = 2 + NA − 2 +
p
(2 − 2)2 + 5 ≥
p
(NA − 2)NA + 5 is always fulﬁlled.
The rhs of this inequality is always smaller than
p
N2
A + 5. Squaring both sides and
simplifying yields 2NA
√
5 > 0. Putting θ = θ2
A and ¯ θ = θ2
D, the claim follows. q.e.d.
A.2: Underdogs and favorites
For the Tullock contest success function (2) it is straightforward to check from
(6) that group A is the underdog [favorite] if and only if the equilibrium winning
probability p∗
A is smaller [larger] than 1/2. It is also straightforward to check that
pad
A is equal in sign to θWA(sA) − WD(sD). We now calculate the values of pA
ad.
13• Assume that sD = 0,sA = 1: This is an equilibrium if and only if θ ≥ ¯ θ(α).
Then pad
A ≥ 0 if and only if θ ≥ Φ(α)/N (insert the appropriate rents and solve
for θ). This function lies below Φ(α), which in turn lies below ¯ θ(α) (cf. Figure
1). This property implies that pad
A (1,0) > 0, eﬀort by group A is a strategic
complement to eﬀort by group D, and eﬀort by D is a strategic substitute to
eﬀort by A.
• Assume that sD = 1 and sA = 0 which is an equilibrium if and only if θ ≤ θ(α).
In that case, pad
A (0,1) ≥ 0 if and only if θ ≥ ˜ θ(α) := αNΦ(α). Inspection of
˜ θ(α) shows that this is an increasing function. Comparing ˜ θ(α) and θ(α) at
α = 2/N (the smallest value of α to make the problem well deﬁned) reveals that
˜ θ(2/N) > θ(2/N). Given that θ(α) is decreasing, the (α,θ)-combinations that
are consistent with sD = 1,sA = 0 are always in an area where pad
A (0,1) < 0:
eﬀort by group A is a strategic substitute to eﬀort by group D, and eﬀort by
D is a strategic complement to eﬀort by A.
• Assume that sD = sA = 1, which is an equilibrium if and only if θ(α) ≤
θ ≤ ¯ θ(α). Then, pad
A (1,1) ≥ 0 iﬀ θ ≥ Φ(α). This type of equilibrium does dot
depend on the sign of the cross derivative. However, it has to be relatively
small in absolute terms. •
Appendix B: Proofs for Section 4
B.2: Proof of Proposition 2
1. If θ ≤ θ the equilibrium is {0,1}, and we compare utility levels VD(0,0), VD(0,1)
and VA(0,0), VA(0,1). Members of group A are better oﬀ by revealed preference.
Individuals of group D are worse oﬀ, VD(0,1) − VD(0,0) < 0, iﬀ
−
(N − 1)θ(1 + N + N(1 + N)θ(N − 1)Nθ2)
(1 + θ)2(1 + Nθ)2((1 − z)R + zNP)
< 0, (B.1)
which is always fulﬁlled.
2. If θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θ] the equilibrium is {1,1}, and we compare utility levels VD(0,0),




(1 + θ)2((1 − z)R + zNP)
< 0, (B.2)
14and members of group D are worse oﬀ, VD(1,1) < VD(0,0), iﬀ
−
(N − 1)θ
(1 + θ)2((1 − z)R + zNP)
< 0. (B.3)
Both conditions are always fulﬁlled.
3. The proof of this case is symmetric to the proof of case 1. q.e.d.
B.2: Proof of Propositions 3
Proposition 3.a: As the equilibrium is (sA,sD) = (1,1), we compare utilities
VA(1,1), VA(0,0), and VD(1,1), VD(0,0), respectively. Our aim is to arrive at con-
ditions on the model parameters (θ,α,N) such that members in both groups are










Figure 3: α-N-combinations for which VA(1,1) − VA(0,0) or VD(1,1) − VD(0,0) are
positive. α ∈ [0,3] is on the abscissa and N ∈ [2,11] is on the ordinate.
9The proof of the proposition has been carried out by the help of Mathematica 7.0. A ﬁle with
the detailed programming code can be received from the authors upon request.
15As a ﬁrst set of conditions, we must ensure that both groups have at least two
members and that (sA,sD) = (1,1) is in fact a Nash equilibrium. This requires that:
• α ≥ 2/N,
• θ ≤ θ ≤ ¯ θ.
Next, group members in A must better oﬀ with (sA,sD) = (1,1). Checking
VA(1,1) > VA(0,0) yields that
• θ > θA :=
p
(α − 1)2N ((α − 1)2N + 4) − (2 + ((α − 2)α − 1)N)
1 + (α − 2)N ,
• (1 + αN) > 2N.
Analogously, individuals of group D are better oﬀ iﬀ VD(1,1) > VD(0,0) which
requires that
• θ < θD :=
p
(α − 1)2N(4α + (α − 1)2N) − ((α(2 + α) − 1)N − 2α)
α(N − 1) ,
• (1 + N) > 2αN.
While the set of (α,N)-combinations consistent with all six inequalities just pre-
sented is not empty, it cannot be characterized analytically in an explicit form. Yet,
a graphical illustration is feasible. Figure 3 provides one. Area A violates α ≥ 2/N.
Area B is the set of all pairs (α,N) such that VD(1,1) − VD(0,0) > 0. In all
other cases (areas C and D), VD(1,1) − VD(0,0) < 0. Area D is the range where
VA(1,1) − VA(0,0) > 0. In all other cases (areas B and C), VA(1,1) − VA(0,0) < 0.
q.e.d.
Proposition 3.b: Suppose that θ < θ (the case θ > ¯ θ follows by a similar token).
We compare sD = sA = 0 and sD = 1,sA = 0. By a revealed-preference argument,
group D must be better oﬀ because group A’s choice is the same in both situations.
Denote by RA = (1−z)R+zαNP and RD = (1−z)R+zNP the aggregate group









2RA + Nθ(αN + 1)RD
￿
+ (N + 1)RD
￿
< 0,
where Ψ1 = θ(αN −1)R2
DRA and Ψ2 = N2(1+θ)2R2
A(RD +NθRA). This condition,
however, can never be fulﬁlled given the assumptions of the model. q.e.d.
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